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A CURTAIN CALL FOR DOCUDRAMA-DEFAMATION
ACTIONS: A CLEAR STANDARD TAKES A BOW
In September 1973, a violent military coup took place which de-
posed the Chilean government of Salvador Allende Gossens.' The coup
resulted in the death or disappearance of many people,2 including a
young American citizen, Charles Horman.3 Horman disappeared from
his home in Santiago a few days after the military takeover and a body
with fingerprints matching his was subsequently found elsewhere in
Chile.4 The extent of the United States' involvement in the coup was the
topic of considerable speculation.
Thomas Hauser researched and wrote a nonfictional account of the
circumstances surrounding the disappearance and death of Charles
Horman in his book entitled The Execution of Charles Horman: An
American Sacrifice.5 The book became the basis for the motion picture
Missing directed by Constantin Costa-Gavras.6 The book as well as the
film became the subject of a libel action brought by State Department
officials and a naval officer.
The case eventually came before the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York in Davis v. Costa-Gavras ("Davis").7
The Davis court illustrated the standard for applying First Amendment
protections to dramatized accounts of true events. The court held that
minor fictionalizations in docudramas which do not distort the essence of
the facts believed to be true do not support a finding of actual malice in a
public figure defamation action.




5. Id. The book was published in hardcover in 1978 by Harcourt Brace Jovanoich, Inc.
It was republished in paperback by The Hearst Corp. Id.
6. Id. The film was released by Universal City Studios, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary
of MCA, Inc. Id.
7. 654 F. Supp. 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). Originally this action named as defendants:
Hauser, the author of Execution; Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., publishers of the
hardback version of Hauser's book; Hearst, publisher of the paperback; and Costa-Gavras the
director. Davis v. Costa-Gavras, 580 F. Supp. 1082 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). Hauser's and Harcourt,
Brace, Jovanovich, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment was granted. Davis v. Costa-Gavras,
595 F. Supp. 982 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). Hearst's motion for summary judgment was granted. The
case subsequently came before the court for a judgment on the pleadings. The motion was
granted with respect to two State Department Officials who were originally plaintiffs in the
suit. Davis v. Costa-Gavras, 619 F. Supp. 1372 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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This casenote briefly reviews the development of the law of defama-
tion concerning public figures and discusses the applicability of this law
to dramatizations of true events. The note concludes by stating why the
court sets forth the proper rule applicable to this genre of speech.
Davis' involved a libel action brought by Ray Davis9 against the
makers of the film Missing for their alleged portrayal of him in the movie.
The case was before the court on a motion by the defendants for sum-
mary judgment. Missing was a docudrama,1 ° portraying the American
military presence in Chile at the time of the uprising and the Allende
coup. The theme of the film is the search for a missing man, Charles
Horman, by his wife and his father. Charles Horman is finally found to
have been executed by the Chilean military.
While the film does not purport to depict a chronology of the events
precisely as they occurred,"' Missing is based on a true story. The film
reflects the composite conduct of the American governmental representa-
tives in Chile at that time and the degree of their assistance in the search
for Charles Horman. It is in this setting that the film came under scru-
tiny and criticism. While no character in the film is named "Ray Davis",
the character with whom Davis associates himself is Ray Tower, 2 a sym-
bolic fictional composite of the American political and military en-
tourage in Chile at that time.13 Tower is depicted as someone with the
power or authority to order the Chilean military to execute Horman; he
is shown as having close connections to the recently installed junta.14
The movie is a dramatic portrayal of events and interpretations de-
tailed in Thomas Hauser's book, The Execution of Charles Horman: An
American Sacrifice ("Execution"). The filmmakers met with Hauser i"
inquiring about his investigation and his sources. They supplied him
8. 654 F. Supp. 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
9. Ray Davis was the Commander of the United States Military Group, and Chief of the
United States Mission to Chile at the time of the 1973 coup in Chile. Id. at 654.
10. Docudramas differ from documentaries. Docudramas utilize simulated dialogue, com-
posite characters, and telescoping of events occurring over a period into a composite scene or
scenes. A documentary is a non-fictional story or series of historical events portrayed in their
actual location: a film of real people and real events as they occur. A documentary maintains
strict fidelity to fact. Id. at 658.
11. The film opens with the prologue: "This film is based on a true story. The incidents
and facts are documented. Some of the names have been changed to protect the innocent and
also to protect the film." Id. at 657.
12. In the film, Ed Horman, the father of the missing man, asserts the theory that Ray
Tower ordered or approved a Chilean order to kill Charles Horman because he "knew too
much" about the alleged American involvement in the Chilean coup. Id. at 659.
13. Id. at 655.
14. Davis v. Costa-Gavras, 619 F. Supp. 1372, 1377 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
15. Thomas Hauser was a lawyer who had served as a judicial clerk in the chambers of a
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with drafts of the script and were satisfied that there was no reason to
doubt his work. They knew that Hauser had interviewed Davis, as well
as other United States officials in Chile while writing Execution. The
filmmakers also knew that no legal action was taken against the book
during the approximately four years since its publication. 6
While the filmmakers never attempted to verify the facts with Davis,
they did consult with other parties involved prior to making the film.
They met with Charles Horman's parents, his wife, and Terry Simon, a
close friend who was with him at the time of his disappearance. Each
of these individuals made clear that Hauser's book accurately and relia-
bly depicted events as they knew and believed them.' 7
Davis' complaint alleged four general catagories of evidence in his
opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment from which the
court could find "actual malice" on behalf of the defendant.' 8 The dis-
trict court, however, concluded that plaintiff had not presented any prov-
able, clear and convincing, affirmative evidence nor specific facts showing
actual malice on the part of the defendants in publishing the alleged defa-
mation. Thus, the complaint by Davis, a public figure, was not sustaina-
ble under the law.19
The district court first set forth the standard which the plaintiff
must prove in order to sustain a cause of action for defamation. The
plaintiff, a public official, must show "actual malice" to sustain a cause of
action for defamation. "Absent such evidence, the action cannot be
maintained as a matter of law."2 To show actual malice, the public fig-
ure claiming to have been defamed must show that the defendant pub-
lished a statement "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not."'" After a careful analysis of the
record, the court concluded "that to accept the plaintiff's opposition to
summary judgment would require a distortion of the proofs, deviation
from applicable law and wrenching the film out of its plain context."
'22




18. (1) Defendants' "entire purpose in making Missing was to show plaintiff as responsible
for Charles Horman's death;" (2) Defendants' reliance on Thomas Hauser's book Execution
was unreasonable; (3) Defendants never consulted with plaintiff on the facts presented in the
film; and (4) Missing contains scenes portraying certain episodes which the defendants knew
were embroidered. Id. at 655.
19. Id. at 659.
20. Id. at 654 (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964)).
21. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
22. Davis v. Costa-Gavras, 654 F. Supp. 653, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
1988]
LOYOLA ENTER TAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
A. The Thesis of the Film
The first of the four grounds alleged by Davis was that Costa-
Gavras' entire purpose in making Missing was to show that Davis was
responsible for Charles Horman's death. The court determined that
while the film Missing is based on a true story, it does not purport to be a
non-fictional documentary establishing that Ray Davis was responsible
for Charles Horman's death. "To the contrary, the papers unalterably
establish that the film is not.., aimed at Ray Davis as an individual, and
cannot be understood as other than the dramatization of a true story."
2 3
Davis failed to come forward with the necessary evidence that the film-
makers "knowingly and falsely published the alleged defamation in the
film, or in fact entertained serious doubts about the truth of the film's
alleged defamatory statement, yet recklessly disregarded those doubts."
24
The filmmakers based their docudrama on Hauser's book Execution and
on the stories told by Horman's wife and father. The filmmakers thor-
oughly investigated and confirmed the sources. They entertained no seri-
ous doubts of the truth of their sources nor did they have any knowledge
to the contrary of what was portrayed. The court further noted "the
First Amendment does not even include 'spite, hostility or intention to
harm'" in finding actual malice.25
B. Filmmakers' Reliance on Hauser's Book
Davis then suggested that the defendants' reliance on the book was
unreasonable and that Hauser's credentials would have disclosed him to
be suspect had the defendants performed a good faith search.2 6 "As a
matter of law, to prevail on a defamation claim against a public official a
plaintiff must do more than propound potential avenues of investigation
that a defendant might have pursued. '[M]ere proof of failure to investi-
gate, without more, cannot establish reckless disregard for the truth.' "27
In order to support a finding of "actual malice," Davis would need to
show that the defendants entertained serious doubts about the veracity of
Hauser's book, or there were obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the
23. Id.
24. Id. at 656; see New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
25. Davis, 654 F. Supp. at 655 (quoting Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398
U.S. 6, 10 (1970)).
26. By claiming that Hauser's credentials were suspect, Davis was referring to Hauser's
political satires where he had written on public issues to officials in the voice of a nine year old
boy, "Martin Bear." These satires were solicited from Hauser by the New York Times and
published on the "op-ed" page. This is hardly reason to suspect the veracity of his book. Id.
at 657.
27. Id. at 656 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 332 (1974)).
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book. "Absent such evidence, reliance on Execution is not evidence of
actual malice."
28
C, Failure to Consult Plaintiff Prior to Making Film
Davis further argued that the filmmakers' failure to personally con-
sult with him prior to presentation of the film was evidence of actual
malice. The district court did not agree:
While "verification of facts" of a story with its subjects and
with others is a desirable and responsible practice and an im-
portant reporting standard, a reporter, without a "high degree
of awareness of their probable falsity," may rely on statements
made by a single source even though they reflect only one side
of the story without fear of libel prosecution ... 29
It concluded that unless Davis had proof that Costa-Gavras knew his
film contained falsities or entertained serious doubts as to its truth, or
had obvious reason to doubt the veracity or accuracy of his sources, his
failure to check with third parties prior to presentation of the film is not
evidence of actual malice.3 °
D. Scenes in Missing as Evidence of Actual Malice
Davis finally set forth nine scenes in the film in which he alleged the
filmmakers distorted the context or made baseless suggestions. The court
determined that none of the scenes listed supplied the requisite evidence
of actual malice necessary to maintain the action.
In reaching this conclusion the court focused on the uniqueness of
"docudrama" as an art form. It drew the distinction between the
docudrama and the documentary, the latter being a "non-fictional story
or series of historical events portrayed in their actual location; a film of
real people and real events as they occur. A documentary maintains
strict fidelity to fact."3 1 Conversely, "the docudrama is a dramatization
of an historical event or lives of real people, using simulated dialogue,
composite characters, and telescoping of events occurring over a period
into a composite scene or scenes."32
Time constraints of films and the attention spans of viewers create a
necessity for the use of such techniques. Hence, partaking of artistic li-
cense is permissible so long as the "alterations of fact in scenes portrayed
28. Davis, 654 F. Supp. at 657.
29. Id. (quoting New York Times v. Conner, 365 F.2d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 1966)).
30. Davis, 654 F. Supp. at 657.
31. Id. at 658.
32. Id.
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are not made with serious doubts of truth or the essence of the telescoped
composite . . . . "I In other words, "minor fictionalizations cannot be
considered evidence or support for the requirement of actual malice."34
The court relied on several cases3 5 to support its finding that the
First Amendment protects this type of speech and did not require literal
truth in every episode in a dramatization of an historical event. Because
Davis did not support his allegations with sufficient proof of malice, the
court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment.
The Davis court provided First Amendment protection to a dramati-
zation of a true event which does not distort "the essence" of those facts
which it believes to be true. The standards which the law has developed
to protect speech are not necessarily easy to apply when the speech is not
of conventional non-fictional reporting form. This does not mean how-
ever, that speech which falls outside this limited category is not deserving
of equal constitutional protection. What it does mean is that the stan-
dards applied to one genre of speech may require modification so that
protection is afforded to other genres of speech. Courts have recognized
the need to modify and adapt standards developed for non-fiction when
applying them to works of fiction. The development of defamation law
demonstrates that the First Amendment does protect fictional as well as
non-fictional speech and in Davis the court developed the necessary stan-
dard for the unique genre "docudrama."
At common law, defamation is "the unconsented to and un-
privileged intentional communication to a third person of a false state-
ment about the plaintiff which tends to harm his reputation in the eyes of
the community."36 Under common law, defamation is a strict liability
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. The court relies on several cases in reaching its conclusion: Street v. Nat'l Broadcast-
ing Co., 645 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 454 U.S. 815, cert. dismissed, 454 U.S. 1095
(1981) (dramatization embodied in defendant's broadcast program on Scottsboro rape trial,
which contained some literal falsehoods, was protected by the New York Times standard, and
not chargeable with actual malice when it was based in all material respects on the judge's
findings and historical documentation); Meeropol v. Nizer, 381 F. Supp. 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
aff'd, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978) (book based on letters
written by Ethel and Julius Rosenberg, convicted spies, containing minor fictionalizations did
not supply the requisite evidence of actual malice); Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977) (Defendant did not print literal words in a book
which purported to quote derogatory remarks made by Ernest Hemingway about the plaintiff.
Actual malice could not be inferred because "the change did not increase the defamatory im-
pact or alter the substantive content" of Hemingway's original statement which defendants
relied upon.).
36. Note, The Supreme Court's Limiting of First Amendment Protection for Defendants in
Defamation Cases, 16 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 171, 172 (1987) (citation omitted).
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tort. Hence, "the only intent required is that the defendant intended to
communicate something to a third person; it does not matter if the de-
fendant did not intend to defame or harm the plaintiff."
3 7
While truth is a defense, the defendant has the burden of proving the
statement is completely true.3  "Belief as to truth, however honest it
may be, is no justification for defamation." 9 The defendant may also
establish a complete defense by showing privilege." A defendant may
claim a qualified privilege which calls for "fair comment" upon the con-
duct of public officers and public employees.4 This privilege extends to
publication of matters that are of general concern to the public.42 There
is disagreement over whether the privilege is restricted to statements ex-
pressing only comment or opinion, or whether it includes misstatements
of fact.43 The majority view is that privilege extends only to comment or
opinion, while the minority view is that privilege extends to misstate-
ments of fact, made for the public benefit with an honest belief in their
truth.44
Ultimately, great works of fiction stimulate thought, promote dis-
cussion and provoke debate on a multitude of issues. Whether an artist
does this through written expression or through the medium of film, his
role is an important one.
The constitutional right of free expression ... is designed and
intended to remove governmental restraints from the arena of
public discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be
voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use
of such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citi-
zenry and a more perfect polity and in the belief that no other
approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity
and choice upon which our system rests.45
Indeed works of fiction are central to our system of free expression and
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 173.
40. Id. (citation omitted). The defendant may be totally immune from liability if an abso-
lute privilege exists. Statements entitled to absolute immunity are (1) those made in the course
of legislative proceedings, (2) executive communications made in the discharge of official du-
ties, (3) those made in the course of judicial proceedings, and (4) those uttered by political
candidates who have been granted equal time under the Federal Communications Act. Id. at
174 (citations omitted).
41. Id. (citations omitted).
42. Id. (citations omitted).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 174-75.
45. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
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are as deserving of constitutional protection as any political treatise or
topical newstory.46
The Supreme Court has noted that fiction often serves as the vehicle
for commentaries on our values, habits, customs, laws, prejudices, heri-
tage and future.47 To provide less protection to works of fiction than
other forms of speech would only serve to inhibit the "robust debate"
which the First Amendment protects.
Indeed, Dickens and Dostoevski may well have written more
trenchant and comprehensive commentaries on their times than
any factual recitation could ever yield. Such authors are no less
entitled to express their views than the town crier with the daily
news or the philosopher with his discourse on the nature of
justice.4"
Because film is the medium chosen for the fictionalization of an
event, does not lessen its First Amendment protections. The Supreme
Court long ago recognized that informing can be accomplished through
entertainment just as entertainment can be informative: "The impor-
tance of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion is not lessened by
the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as to inform."49
The Supreme Court determined for the first time in 1964, 50 the ex-
tent to which the Constitution protects free speech and the press, by lim-
iting a state's power to award damages in a libel action brought by a
public official against critics of his official conduct."' One authority has
concluded that to find liability for defamation of a public figure under the
New York Times standard, the plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that the
statement is false; (2) that the content defamed the plaintiff's reputation;
(3) that the alleged defamatory statement is "of and concerning" the
plaintiff; and (4) that the defendant acted with the knowledge that the
statement was false or acted in reckless disregard of the truth.52
The fourth prong of the New York Times test, the "actual malice"
test, is perhaps the most significant since it is the most difficult to prove.
46. Gugliemi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 867, 603 P.2d 454, 459, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 352, 357 (1979) (nephew of Rudolph Valentino brought a "right of publicity" action
based on a fictionalized film depicting portions of Valentino's life).
47. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 516-20 (1948) (crime magazine containing true
stories of bloodshed, lust or crime deserving of First Amendment protection as is "propaganda
through fiction").
48. Gugliemi, 25 Cal. 3d at 868.
49. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952).
50. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) [hereinafter "New York Times"].
51. Id. at 256.
52. Rich & Brillant, Defamation-In-Fiction: The Limited Viability of Alternative Causes of
Action, 52 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 5 (1986).
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In New York Times, the Supreme Court defined "actual malice" as pub-
lishing a defamatory statement "with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."53 This differed from
common law malice which was frequently expressed in terms of ill-will,
spite, or a deliberate intention to harm the plaintiff. The new standard
focuses on the defendant's attitude toward the truth or falsity of the ma-
terial published. 4 "Malice" in the common law sense is constitutionally
insufficient to support a finding of "actual malice."55 The application of
the actual malice standard experienced a period of expansion and later a
narrowing in the years following New York Times. 6
While the "actual malice" test set forth in New York Times works
quite well for a publication claiming to be a recitation of an event, it has
its shortcomings when applied to the equally protected area of works of
fiction. The danger in applying the "actual malice" standard to fiction
becomes evident when one realizes that fiction, by its very nature, is pub-
lished with conscious disregard as to its falsity, thus rendering all works
of fiction potentially defamatory. Hence, fiction requires First Amend-
ment protection under a standard appropriate to its own nature.
Courts have recognized the difficulty in applying the actual malice
standard, which is predicated on the defendant's knowledge of the falsity
or reckless disregard of the truth, to works of fiction.
[I]n defamation cases, the concern is with defamatory lies mas-
querading as truth. In contrast, the author who denotes his
work as fiction proclaims his literary license and indifference to
"the facts." There is no pretense. All fiction, by definition, es-
chews an obligation to be faithful to historical truth. Every fic-
tion writer knows his creation is in some sense "false." That is
the nature of the art. Therefore, where fiction is the medium
... it is meaningless to charge that the author "knew" his work
was false.57
Rather than focusing on the "actual malice" prong of New York Times,
53. 376 U.S. at 280.
54. Note, The Supreme Court's Limiting of First Amendment Protection for Defendants in
Defamation Cases, 16 N.C. CENT. L. REV. at 192 (citations omitted).
55. Id.
56. The "actual malice" standard was extended to "public figures" in Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), and Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). Justice
Brennan writing for a plurality extended the "actual malice" standard to all matters of general
and public interest in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971). The Supreme Court
later retreated, holding that the New York Times standard was inapplicable in a case where the
plaintiff was a private individual. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
57. Gugliemi, 25 Cal. 3d at 872, 603 P.2d at 461, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
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which carries the potential of stifling all fiction, the courts have tended to
focus on the "of and concerning" or third prong of the test. With non-
fiction, all that is needed is a straightforward analysis of the allegedly
defamatory material. Typically, the statement includes a specific refer-
ence to the plaintiff, either by name, occupation or photograph.58 In a
non-fiction setting any reference that identifies an individual is assumed
to be "of and concerning" that individual.59
The application of the "of and concerning" test differs somewhat in
works of fiction where it is insufficient for the plaintiff to prove only that
the allegedly defamatory material referred to him. Instead, the plaintiff
must also show that the statements can reasonably be understood as
describing actual facts about him or his actual conduct. 6 The test is
"whether a reasonable person reading the book, would understand that
the fictional character therein pictured was, in actual fact, the plaintiff
acting as described."'"
The necessity of focusing on the "of and concerning" aspect of the
test as opposed to the "actual malice" aspect in fiction-defamation claims
is clear. It is meaningless to charge that an author of fiction "knew his
work was false" and is therefore guilty of defamation when fiction by its
very nature is false. To claim that because some "truths" do exist in a
fictional work, it is therefore held to the "actual malice" standard of def-
amation, shows a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of fiction.
Fiction by its very nature starts with an element of reality onto which it
embroiders fancy and fantasy. To require otherwise would stifle the cre-
ative process requiring an author to create "mythological worlds of char-
acters wholly divorced from reality."62 With these cases as background,
the Davis court had to formulate an appropriate standard for the
docudrama.
The decision to focus on the "of and concerning" element in a fic-
tion-defamation action is the logical choice. While this focus is still rele-
vant, it is not the crucial focus in the docudrama-defamation setting.
Works such as Missing, which are dramatizations of true stories, require
58. Rich & Brillant, supra note 52 at 8.
59. Id.
60. Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438, 440 (1983) (magazine article could not
possibly have been reasonably understood as describing facts about plaintiff, who was a beauty
pageant contestant, where portions of the article described the contestant as performing oral
sex on her coach, on national television, causing him to levitate).
61. Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 78, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, 39 (1979) (novel made
claims that plaintiff conducted "nude therapy sessions" in order to help clients shed their
psychological inhibitions).
62. Gugliemi, 25 Cal. 3d at 868, 603 P.2d at 460, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
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yet another modification of the New York Times standard if they are to
truly receive the constitutional protections of the First Amendment.
A look at the "of and concerning" test is relevant at some point
during the docudrama-defamation action. Earlier, the case was before
the court for a judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the motion
picture Missing was not, as a matter of law, reasonably susceptible to the
defamatory meaning ascribed to it by the plaintiffs.63 The test the court
applied was "whether a reasonable person, viewing the motion picture,
would understand that the character portrayed in the film was, in actual
fact, the plaintiff acting as described."'  The court found that the movie
Missing was reasonably susceptible of the interpretation that Davis or-
dered or approved the order for the murder of Horman, thus the court
denied the motion.65
At this point the focus was on the "of and concerning" test out of
procedural necessity. The issue of "actual malice" could not even be
considered yet. This motion was for judgment on the pleadings, hence
the plaintiff had not been afforded the opportunity to conduct any dis-
covery. Without this opportunity, he would be unable to make the deter-
mination regarding the defendant's state of mind necessary for a
showing of actual malice.
When the case came before the court again, Costa-Gavras brought a
motion for summary judgment. 66 The court reached the four conclu-
sions outlined above: (1) the filmmaker's reliance on the book did not
show actual malice; (2) failure to consult with plaintiff prior to making
the film did not show actual malice; (3) the filmmaker's purpose was not
to make a non-fictional film establishing that Davis was responsible for
Horman's death, it was clearly a dramatization of a true story; and (4)
dramatizations of actual events did not show actual malice. The fourth
conclusion was the most significant in terms of its message to the en-
tertainment industry. It clarified the standard to be applied in defama-
tion actions concerning the unique art form which attempts to dramatize
a true story. While a work of fiction may be inspired by an actual
event,6 7 the author changes names and settings in an exercise of creative
63. Davis, 619 F. Supp. 1372 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
64. Id. at 1375.
65. Id. at 1383. (Motion was granted with respect to Consul Purdy and Ambassador Da-
vis. Although both were portrayed unfavorably in the movie, the movie could not be reason-
ably interpreted to suggest that either of them ordered or approved the killing of Horman.)
66. Davis v. Costa-Gavras, 654 F. Supp. 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
67. Fictional characters "grow out of real persons the author has met or observed. . ..
The end result may be fictional ... but the acorn of fact is usually the progenitor of the oak,
19881
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expression. The author makes no claims as to the truth of the work,
hence the difficulty in applying "actual malice."
Conversely, the dramatization of the true life event draws elements
from both fact and fiction. It overtly claims to be based on a true story
but nevertheless may, of artistic necessity, create a character, which
bears a close resemblance to the person claiming to be defamed, but
which is actually meant to represent a composite of several characters
who took part in the actual event. The dramatization also may of artistic
necessity telescope the time frame under which certain events took place.
In this sense all docudrama would be subject to claims of "actual malice"
since all docudramas would contain "knowing falsehoods." The ques-
tion then becomes, what is an artist to do to avoid liability in a situation
where he wants to depict a true story, but must out of necessity alter the
"truth" of the work?
A strict adherence to the New York Times "actual malice" standard
has the potential of leaving options open to the docudramatist so absurd,
that this form of creative expression would effectively be eliminated. By
that test, if a filmmaker attempting docudrama is to be certain to avoid
liability for defamation, he would have to produce a film which runs as
long as the actual event in order to include every minute and every word
of every character. Omitting anything which he knew actually occurred
might be construed as acting with the knowledge that the statement was
false or with reckless disregard for the truth. Certainly, to require this
would create such a burden that it would in effect eliminate this form of
creative expression.
Film is an obvious vehicle for communicating to a wide range of
people on a wide range of topics. Film however, because of time con-
straints, is often forced to telescope time frames and make use of compos-
ite characters thus altering in some ways the truth of what actually took
place. Nevertheless, in keeping with our constitutional commitment to
"open and robust dialogue" this type of speech must be protected from
potentially chilling defamation actions.
The court in Davis stated that "the cases on point demonstrate that
the First Amendment protects such dramatizations and does not demand
literal truth in every episode depicted;68 publishing a dramatization is not
which when full grown no longer has any resemblance to the acorn." People v. Scribner's Sons,
205 Misc. 818, 821, 130 N.Y.S.2d 514, 517 (1954).
68. There are many other instances when a defamation action has been brought against the
author who employs minor fictionalizations in recounting a true event. See, e.g., Hotchner v.
Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910, 914, (1977) (minor fictionalizations which did not increase the
defamatory impact or alter the substantive content of Hemingway's statements about plaintiff
did not support a finding of actual malice); Leopold v. Levin, 259 N.E.2d 250, 256, (1970)
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of itself evidence of actual malice."6 9 An author who attempts to create
a dramatization of a true event "partakes of author's license," his work is
a "creative interpretation of reality and if alterations of fact in scenes
portrayed are not made with serious doubts of truth of the essence of the
telescoped composite, such scenes do not ground a charge of actual
malice."7
This modification of the New York Times "actual malice" standard
works well for the docudrama. It allows the filmmaker the freedom to
make necessary dramatic embellishments, yet still imposes a "good faith"
requirement on him not to distort the truth of the fundamental story
being told. A filmmaker who entertains no serious doubts as to the ve-
racity of his sources, may make changes, so long as the changes do not
increase the defamatory impact of the facts which he believes to be true.
The modified standard also allows the filmmaker to express his own
political leanings in the film which may color his historical perspective,
so long as there is no extreme disregard for the truth. This comports
with the actual malice standard which is "flexible and encourages diverse
political opinions and robust debates about social issues."'" The stan-
dard however, is not without limits. "It does not abolish all the common
law of libel even in the political context. It still protects us against the
'big political lie,' the conscious or reckless falsehood."7 2
Davis v. Costa-Gavras clarifies the precautions a filmmaker should
take in order to protect himself from potential liability for defamation, if
he attempts to create a docudrama. Initially, he should conduct careful
research on the issue surrounding his film. His research should be thor-
ough to the point that he entertains no serious doubts as to the truth of
any sources he relies on in his film. Any dramatic overlays should not
create a more defamatory impact than the sources themselves. In other
words, every element in the dramatized scene should be traceable to an
actual fact derived from the filmmaker's source. Finally, care should be
(novel and film derived from notorious crime were not defamatory when fictionalized aspects
of the book and motion picture were reasonably comparable to, or conceivable from facts of
record from which they were drawn); Street v. Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 645 F.2d 1227, 1237
(1981) (no evidence to support a finding of actual malice in author's attempt to create a televi-
sion historical drama about the Scottsboro rape trial, when there was no evidence of bad faith
or conscious disregard of the truth); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1065 (1977) (minor
fictionalizations in book about Ethel and Julius Rosenberg can be attributed to the leeway
afforded an author who attempts to recount and popularize an historic event and do not rise to
the constitutional level of a clear and convincing showing of reckless disregard).
69. Davis, 654 F. Supp. at 658.
70. Id. (emphasis added).
71. Street v. Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 645 F.2d 1227, 1237 (1981).
72. Id.
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taken that the film clearly represents itself as a docudrama to ensure that
the viewer does not mistakenly believe it to be a documentary. This can
be accomplished in the prologue and epilogue to the film, as was done in
Missing.
To conclude, the application of the First Amendment to
docudramas is essential to the protection of a valuable vehicle for the
exchange of ideas. Restricting speech in this area would subvert the poli-
cies upon which freedom of speech is based. An author should be free to
exercise necessary artistic license without the chilling effects of defama-
tion actions. Condoning such actions would result in suppressing vital
expression. Thus, the holding that actual malice is found only where an
author has distorted the essence of that which he believes to be true
should be embraced by all jurisdictions if free speech is truly to flourish.
Amy J. Field
